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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The post 9/11 scenario in Pakistan’s economy can readily be identified with a host 
of positive developments. Real GDP growth rates have averaged around 6 percent since 
2002, stock market surges have broken all the previous records, there is much more 
dynamism in the banking industry, capital flows are pouring into the economy, foreign 
exchange reserves have swelled to record high levels, and poverty has witnessed a 
declining trend. However, what mars these celebrations since last year is the scepticism 
of some market commentators on the growing vulnerability of Pakistan’s economy to 
crisis.1 The main weakness, as widely pointed out, remains the sustainability of current 
account deficit along with rising fiscal imbalances. 
A review of empirical literature on the determinants of currency crisis introduces a 
host of macroeconomic fundamentals broadly based on the predictions of the seminal 
first- and second-generation models. Although the list of these determinants varies from 
study to study, the consensus appears to be on the sustainability of external and fiscal 
positions as the main predictors of a crisis. An overview of the Pakistani fundamentals 
since 2000 reveals that broadly key Pakistani economic indicators do not give an 
immediate cause for concern. However, the emergence of primary budget balance as a 
deficit and the growing trade and current account deficits in the last two years does seem 
to be a cause for concern. 
Therefore, the objective of this study is to analyse the vulnerability of Pakistan’s 
economy to crisis by evaluating the sustainability of its external and fiscal positions in the 
recent past. In particular, we focus on Masson’s (1999) model of contagion to assess 
Pakistan’s external position and Bohn’s (1998) fiscal sustainability regressions to 
evaluate Pakistan’s fiscal position. Our findings are that the Pakistani fundamentals do 
not present an adverse scenario as particularly indicated in the external and fiscal 
sustainability conditions of the recent past. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical 
literature on the determinants of crisis as broadly predicted by the first- and second-
generation models. Section 3 gives an overview of the key Pakistani fundamentals since 
2000. Section 4 outlines the methodologies and Section 5 gives the results. Section 6 
concludes the study.  
Safdar Ullah Khan <safdar.khan@sbp.org.pk> and Omar Farooq Saqib <omar.farooq@sbp.org.pk> are 
respectively Analyst and Senior Economist in the Research Department of the State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi.  
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1Since last year, scepticism on the sustainability of Pakistan’s current account deficit often appears in 
the media. 
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2.  MODELS OF CRISIS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
The painstaking implications of the crisis of 1990s notwithstanding, they have 
been a source of great intellectual excitement as well. Following these crisis therefore a 
considerable amount of literature on their causes and symptoms has emerged. There are 
broadly two lines of argument on this issue. The first school is the so called first-
generation models of crisis and the other school is termed as the second-generation 
models of crisis. While the former follows the seminal work by Krugman (1979) and 
Flood and Garber (1984), the latter follows Obstfeld (1986) and (1996). 
The first-generation models simply argue that a crisis, collapse of an exchange rate 
peg in particular, is an outcome of inconsistent monetary policy induced by fiscal 
considerations of monetisation of budget deficit that result in the loss of foreign exchange 
reserves. When foreign exchange reserves fall below a critical value, speculators attack 
the exchange rate peg leading to the unique equilibrium of crisis. The main prediction of 
these models is the deterioration in fiscal imbalances preceding a crisis. The second-
generation models, on the other hand, predict crisis as an outcome of self-fulfilling 
expectations not driven by fiscal imbalances alone but from a host of other economic 
fundamentals. These include, most notably, growth rate, unemployment, inflation, debt, 
and current account deficit. 
The main distinguishing feature between the first- and second- generation models 
is that the former is subject to unique equilibrium and the latter to multiple, given its 
feature of self-fulfilling prophecies. This feature is based on the notion of speculation. 
While its proponents imply self-fulfilling in its literal meaning, they suggest ‘speculation’ 
as its driver. They do not however explain what really drives speculation, other than the 
deterioration in fundamentals. Eventually, it is economic fundamentals that predict the 
outcome. Therefore, the distinction between these models remains theoretical, as the 
crisis is ‘fundamentals-driven’ in both models. 
On the other hand, there is no commonly agreed set of macro fundamentals to 
assess the vulnerability of an economy to speculative attacks. Indeed, in actual events of 
crisis in the 1990s, the fundamentals differed widely across, for example, Exchange Rate 
Mechanism crisis of 1992-93, Tequila crisis of 1994-95, and East Asian crisis of 1997-
98. Therefore, in the empirical contents of the literature on currency crisis a wide variety 
of fundamentals as the leading indicators has emerged. These indicators stem mainly 
from the actual episodes of crisis and from the predictions of the aforementioned seminal 
models and are a result of a fairly large number of empirical studies. 
These studies can be classified into two categories. First category investigates the 
determinants of crisis in a single country analysis; while the second focuses on the multi-
country ones. Tables 1 and 2 summarise the list of economic fundamentals in both select 
single- and multi-country studies. The country-specific studies suggest domestic credit 
growth, exchange rate misalignments, foreign exchange reserve losses, debt structure, 
and expansionary fiscal and monetary policies as some of the leading indicators. The 
results obtained from multi-country category are not as interesting and robust as the 
single country’s ones. Nevertheless, they introduce a wide variety of determinants. These 
studies do not consider structural and/or political factors, except Klein and Marion 
(1997), Bussière and Mulder (2000), Saqib (2003), and Fic and Saqib (2006) and focus 
exclusively on economic fundamentals. 
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What emerges from Tables 1 and 2 and the above discussion is the significance of 
fiscal and external fundamentals in predicting a crisis. In particular, fiscal sustainability 
as manifested in budget deficits, domestic credit, and public debt; and the external 
sustainability as apparent in international reserves, real exchange rate, external debt, and 
trade deficit.  
Table 1 
Indicators of Crisis: Select Single-country Literature 
Study Indicator(s) Findings 
Blanco and Garber 
(1986) 
[Mexico, 1973-1982] 
Domestic credit growth Very significant 




Domestic credit growth Very significant 
Goldberg (1994) 
[Mexico, 1980-1986] 
(1) Domestic credit growth; (2) 
Exchange rate misalignments; (3) 
Relative prices; (4) External credit; 
(5) Demand for money 
Very significant: (1), 
(2); Significant: (3), 
(4), (5) 
Pazarbasioglu and 
Ötker (1997) [Mexico, 
1982-1994] 
(1) Domestic credit; (2) Real 
exchange rate; (3) Foreign reserves; 
(4) Real output growth; (5) Inflation 
differential; (6) Expansionary 




[ERM crisis, 1992: 
Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Ireland, Italy, 
Spain] 
(1) Domestic credit; (2) Budget 
deficit; (3) Unemployment rate; (4) 
Foreign price level 
Significant: (1)-(4) 





(1) Macroeconomic: Government 
expenditure, Foreign reserves, Real 
Exchange rate; Net exports; (2) 
Political: Elections, Number of 
political parties forming a 
government 
Very significant: (2) 
Significant: (1) 
Fic and Saqib (2006) 
[Russia, August 1998 
Crisis] 
(1) Macroeconomic: Real effective 
exchange rate, GDP, Inflation, 
Domestic credit, External debt, oil 
price; (2) Political: Political 
instability index 
Very significant: (2) 
Significant: (1) 
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Table 2 
Indicators of Crisis: Select Multi-country Literature 
Study Indicators Findings 
Frankel and Rose (1996) 
[Over 100 Countries, 
1971-1992] 
(1) Debt composition [commercial 
bank, concessional, variable-rate, 
short-term, FDI, Public sector]; (2) 
External variables [international 
reserves to monthly imports, current 
account, external debt, real exchange 
rate]; (3) Domestic macroeconomic 
variables [government budget, 
domestic credit growth, real output 
per capita growth]; (4) Foreign 




domestic credit growth, 
foreign interest rate, real 
exchange rate; Not 
significant: government 
budget, current account 
Klein and Marion (1997) 
[17 Countries, 1957-
1990] 
(1) Macroeconomic variables [real 
exchange rate, net foreign assets, 
multiple exchange rate]; (2) Structural 
factors [openness, geographical trade 
concentration]; (3) Political factors 
[executive transfers, coups] 
Significant: real 




Esquivel and Larraín 
(1998) [30 Countries, 
1975-1996] 
(1) Seignorage; (2) Current account 
balance; (3) Terms of trade shock; (4) 
Real exchange rate; M2/Reserves; (5) 
Per capita income growth; (6) 
Contagion effects 
Significant: seignorage, 
real exchange rate, terms 






Reinhart (1998) [20 
Countries, 1970-1995] 
(1) International reserves; (2) 
Domestic credit; (3) Domestic 
inflation; (4) Real exchange rate; (5) 
Credit to public sector; (6) Trade 
balance; (7) Money growth; (8) Fiscal 
deficit; (9) Export performance; (10) 
Real GDP growth 
Very significant: (1)-(5); 
Significant: (6)-(10) 
Bussière and Mulder 
(2000) [1994 and 1997 
Crisis Episodes] 
(1) Political variables: effective 
number of parties, elections, 
uncertainty, coalition, ; (2) Economic 
fundamentals: real exchange rate, 
lending boom, liquidity level. 
Very significant: (1) but 
conditional on the 
weaknesses in 
fundamentals as in (2). 
Athukorala and Warr 
(2002) [East Asia , 1997-
1998 Crisis] 
(1) Domestic credit; (2) Real 
exchange rate; (3) Mobile capital 
accumulation 
Very significant 
 Pakistan’s Vulnerability to Economic Crisis 601
3.  OVERVIEW OF KEY PAKISTANI FUNDAMENTALS 
After the so-called ‘lost decade’ of 1990s, Pakistan’s economy rebounded in 2000s 
by posting impressive growth rates with relatively stable prices. Table 3 summarises 
some of the key indicators of Pakistan’s economy that present a reasonably stable 
macroeconomic environment.   
Table 3 
Key Pakistani Macroeconomic Indicators, 2000-2007 
(Units as Indicated)  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Inflationa 3.60 4.40 3.50 3.10 4.60 9.30 7.90 7.80 
Growth Rateb 4.87 1.97 3.11 4.73 7.48 8.96 6.61 7.02 



































































































Ratei  102.43  89.57  92.49  89.19  91.48  93.34  95.14  95.63 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan. 
Note: The annual observations mentioned here correspond to the fiscal years; for example, 2000 is FY00. 
  agrowth in Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
  bannual percentage change in real GDP. 
  cSBP Discount rate; figures in parenthesis are 6-month T-bill rate. 
  dbudget deficit as percent GDP;  figures in parenthesis are  primary balance as percent GDP. 
  epublic debt as percent GDP; figures in parenthesis are billions of rupees. 
  fcurrent account balance as percent GDP; figures in parenthesis are trade balance as percent GDP.  
gexternal debt as percent GDP; figures in parenthesis are millions of dollars.  
hinternational reserves as percent GDP; figures in parenthesis are billions of dollars.  
ireal effective exchange rate (REER; a rise in the index indicates appreciation of rupee).  
The average growth rate of more than 6 percent since 2004 in Pakistan was 
observed on the back of favourable developments in various sectors. Inflation recorded 
two fold increases of 9.30 percent in 2005 as compared to the previous year of 2004. This 
hike in inflation was observed for the first time since 2000, as it remained below 5 
percent most of the time (from 2000–2005). During the next two years, however inflation 
increased, albeit less than the hike of 2005; therefore, prompting the authorities to raise 
discount rate as a policy measure. 
While the public debt to GDP ratio has been on a declining trend since 2001, fiscal 
balances, budget and primary budget balances, are emerging as a source of concern for 
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the last two years. Public debt as a percent to GDP was recorded at 86.13 percent in 2000, 
from where it came down to 55.61 percent in 2007. Primary budget balance remained in 
surplus along with reductions in budget deficits until 2004. However, these favourable 
developments started to reverse from 2005 onwards when primary budget balance went 
into deficit and the budget deficit also increased. Although with high GDP growth rates 
these fiscal imbalances appear to be sustainable, rising current account deficit in the last 
two years pose a threat to this perceived stability. 
It is encouraging to note that external debt to GDP ratio is declining consistently 
since 2002; from 46 percent in 2002 to 27 percent at the end of 2007. Similarly, other 
indicators such as burden of short term debt and liquid foreign exchange reserves with 
respect to financing of imports are at satisfactory levels. Along with the favourable 
movement of foreign exchange reserves, the real effective exchange rate depicted 
stability, especially in the last two years of 2006 and 2007. 
From 2000 to 2005, the current account balance to GDP ratio has remained 
positive mainly due to the shrinking of trade deficit during this time period. However, in 
the following three years (2005-2007), the situation reversed and current account balance 
started to deteriorate. During 2005, trade balance was recorded at –4.10 percent of GDP, 
which pushed current account deficit to increase by –1.40 percent in the same year. 
Similarly, the trade deficit of –6.82 percent of GDP caused further deterioration in 
current account deficit by –4.90 percent of GDP in 2007. Usually, in developing 
countries fiscal imbalances are considered as one of the most important factors of current 
account deterioration; this however is not the only factor in Pakistan as the growth in 
imports had a major contribution in this regard. The trade deficit which was only 0.4 
percent of GDP in 2002 (U.S. $ 294 million) rose sharply to 6.8 percent of GDP (U.S. $ 
9.9 billion) in 2007. 
There are no universally accepted threshold values for either fiscal balances or 
current account deficits that can guide in exactly determining the degree of susceptibility 
of a country to a crisis. Nonetheless, Pakistani fiscal and current account (especially, 
trade balance) balances in 2006 and 2007, when compared to previous few years, do raise 
concerns. Therefore, this calls for a detailed examination of the sustainability of Pakistani 
fiscal and external balances.  
4.  ASSESSING VULNERABILITY: THE METHODOLOGY 
Following the consensus of the preceding two sections, we now present the basic 
methodology to assess Pakistan’s vulnerability to crisis by evaluating its external and 
fiscal positions. We focus on Masson’s (1999) model of contagion to asses Pakistan’s 
external position and Bohn’s (1998) model to evaluate its fiscal position.  
4.1.  External Vulnerability 
Masson’s (1999) model, which views crisis as a result of contagion, refers to the 
vulnerability of an economy to crisis for only certain ranges of fundamentals where 
changes in expectations are self-fulfilling and markets are subject to multiple equilibria. 
The model is based on Jeanne (1997). Jeanne derives the necessary conditions on 
Obstfeld’s (1986) and (1996) hypothesis of grey area of country fundamentals and shows 
that fundamentals determine the grey area where multiple equilibria of a crisis is possible. 
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The study focuses on the 1992-93 crisis of the French franc and describes government 
temptation to devalue in order to decrease the unemployment rate. In the context of 
emerging economies, however, a variable such as external debt is more relevant than 
unemployment rate. Therefore, Masson’s model places prime emphasis on a country’s 
external indebtedness, which as argued, weakens its fundamentals. 
In particular, the vulnerability to crisis depends upon the location of a country’s 
(specifically, external) fundamentals vis-à-vis a certain range of equilibriums: the ‘good,’ 
the ‘bad,’ and the ‘multiple equilibria’ regions. The former two produce unique 
equilibriums of either ‘crisis’ or ‘no-crisis’ respectively; the third depicts the situation of 
both ‘crisis’/‘no-crisis.’ The model formulates the expectations of investors in a 
cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) as follows. 
The probability of crisis ( t ) depends on the size of external debt (D) and the 




2 Letting D , )( 1ttt bE , and assuming innovation in 
tb , 1ttt b , to have a c.d.f. F , then: 
][ ttt F
 
… … … … … … … (1) 
Equation (1) describes the expectations of investors in which a decrease in the 
“expectations-augmented” composite fundamental ( t) and a higher external debt (D) 
leads to higher probability of crisis. Note that the presence of ( t) on both sides of 
Equation (1) implies the probability of multiple solutions. 
The model gives two conditions for multiple equilibria to occur: first condition 




z  … … … … … … … (2) 
is the conventional constant (3.141) and the condition shows the size of external debt 
and the extent of devaluation, relative to the standard deviation ( ) of shocks to the 
composite fundamental. 
The second condition requires t being within minimum and maximum values: 
)()( FF t … … … … … (3) 
Where, zln2 . In particular, Inequality (3) gives the tangency points of the c.d.f of 
the normal distribution. Where, maxt (right hand side) is the ‘good’ equilibrium, mint
 
2ct is the current account deficit, r* is the foreign interest rate, Dt is the external debt, and Rt and R are 
the actual and threshold levels of foreign exchange reserves. The intuition behind this identity is the crucial role 
of foreign exchange reserves and external debt that play in the formation of investors’ expectations. For detailed 
derivation and justification of the identity, see Masson (1999), pp. 589–591. 
3The intuition behind this condition is to do with the size of external debt (or the extent of devaluation) 
and shock; such that, if the debt is too small or the standard deviation of shock, , too large there is going to be 
a single equilibrium solution. 
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(left hand side) is the ‘bad’ equilibrium, and in between the range ( mint , maxt ) is the 
‘multiple’ equilibria region. 
In implementing both conditions, an autoregressive process of order one for the 
current account deficit ( tC ) as a percent of GDP is estimated. The standard error of this 
regression is taken as the estimate of 
 
and some conservative estimate of is 
assumed. 
After determining the criterion [Equation (2)] and the range [Inequality (3)], the 




1 ][ ttttttt DrRRCE … … … … … (4) 
Where, Ct is the fitted value from the regression for the current account deficit, Rt–1 the 
level of foreign exchange reserves, R the threshold value of foreign exchange reserves 
(assumed to be zero), *tr the foreign interest rate (U.S. one year rate on Treasury Bill), 
and Dt the external debt.  
4.2.  Fiscal Sustainability 
Fiscal sustainability is assessed by Bohn’s (1998) test in which government is 
evaluated for its resilience in running large primary budget surpluses amid expanding 
public debt. This test, in turn, is mainly driven from Robert Barro’s seminal work on the 
determinants of public debt in general and the study of U.S. budget deficits in particular 
[Barro (1979, 1986)]. 
In particular, a government is solvent in the long run if its primary budget surplus 
increases in response to rising debt. This amounts to running the following regression: 
ttdt ds … … … … … … … (5) 
Where, st is primary budget surplus to GDP ratio and dt is debt to GDP ratio. In Equation 
(5) a positive d would then confirm the above hypothesis. However, this result would be 
efficient if st and dt are both non-stationary with t as stationary. Otherwise, Regression 
(5) would imply inconsistent estimates of the determinants of st due to omitted variable 
bias. To overcome this problem, Equation (5) is expanded to include non-debt 
determinants of ts  based on Barro’s (1979) revenue-smoothing model: 
ttYtGtdt YVARGVARds 0 … … … … (6) 
tGVAR and tYVAR capture the unusual variations in government’s expenditure and 
output (business cycle) respectively. They are calculated using Barro’s (1986) method as 
presented in Valderrama (2005): 
yGGGVAR trt /)(
)/))(/(1( yGYYYVAR trtrt … … … … … (7) 
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G: government expenditure; Gtr: trend government expenditure; Y: GDP; Ytr: trend GDP; 
y: GDP growth rate. 
Equation (6) can further be expanded to capture the non-linear relationship 
between st and dt by introducing a variable 2)( ddt : 
tttYtGtdt ddYVARGVARds
2
0 )( … … (8) 
The variable 2)( ddt
 
measures the squared deviation of debt to GDP from its mean. 
Therefore, a positive implies that st would react more the larger the deviation of debt 
from its mean.  
5.  THE RESULTS  
5.1.  Pakistan’s External Vulnerability 
In implementing ‘Back-of-the-Envelope’ calculations from Masson’s model, an 
autoregressive process of order one for Pakistan’s current account as percent of GDP is 
estimated (sample: 1975-2007). The standard error of this regression, that is 1.81 percent, 
is taken as the estimate of and is assumed to be 35 percent. Note that in actual 
episodes of crisis, currencies have usually depreciated by much more than this 
assumption; for example, in the maxi-devaluation of Brazil in 1999 the real depreciated 
by more than 70 percent. Furthermore, recall that 2/Dz and zln2 ; 
therefore, a higher value of  might produce biased results. 
After determining the criterion for multiple equibria ( maxmin , tt ) using Equation (3), 
we calculate t using Equation (4). Note however that in actually calculating t we assume 
time period t + 1 as time period t. This facilitates us in determining t for 2007 without 
calculating the forecasted values for the 2008 components of t. Therefore, for the sake of 
maintaining symmetry of the analysis we have used time period t for all the years.4  
Table 4 
Pakistan’s External Vulnerability 
(Units in % GDP, Except *tr )  





2003 40.02 13.76 –0.43 1.24 3.08 3.66 10.35 14.12a 
2004 34.00 13.43 –1.31 1.89 2.62 3.51 8.39 9.93a 
2005 30.70 12.03 –4.07 3.62 2.36 3.40 7.34 6.31b 
2006 27.67 11.32 –6.55 4.94 2.13 3.29 6.40 3.92b 
2007 26.54 11.90 –6.82 4.82 2.04 3.25 6.03 3.92b 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on methodology as outlined in Section 4; data taken from State Bank of Pakistan. 
Note: The annual observations mentioned here correspond to the fiscal years; for example, 2003 is FY03. 
  aInside ‘no-crisis’ region. 
  bInside ‘multiple equilibria’ region.  
4This is a departure from the predictions of the model; nonetheless, one can hardly undermine the 
possibility of investors’ expectations not to include the current values of relevant fundamentals as well. 
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Table 4 summarises the results of these calculations. As evident, Pakistan’s 
composite fundamental in all the years never remained below the lower limit of the 
( maxmin , tt ) range; that is, in ‘crisis’ equilibrium region. In particular, t was within ‘no-
crisis’ equilibrium region in both 2003 and 2004 and close to the upper limit of the 
multiple equilibria region in 2005. In the years 2006 and 2007, t has remained within the 
multiple equilibria region. 
Note that while external debt to GDP ratio has declined significantly from 40.02 
percent in 2003 to 26.54 percent in 2007, the shift of t from ‘no-crisis’ equilibrium 
region to multiple equilibria region in 2005 and onwards can be attributed to two main 
developments. In the first place, current account deficit as a percent to GDP has risen 
sharply from –0.43 percent in 2003 to –4.07 percent in 2005 to –6.82 percent in 2007. 
Second, the deterioration in current account deficit has been accompanied by falling 
foreign exchange reserves and rising foreign interest rates. Nevertheless, the fact that 
economy remained within the multiple equilibria region in the recent past can be 
translated into a lower probability of crisis.  
5.2.  Pakistan’s Fiscal Sustainability 
The results for the fiscal sustainability tests are presented for yearly data series 
(1975-2007), divided into two sub-periods (1975-1995 and 1996-2007). The sub-periods 
roughly correspond to periods of pre and post financial market reforms implemented in 
the Pakistan’s economy. To carry out the tests, we present two alternative specifications 
for the overall and the two sub-periods’ samples. The first, the benchmark specification 
[Equation (6)] and the second [Equation (8)] add a term to capture the nonlinearities in 
the response of primary budget surplus to increases in public debt. 
Table 5 gives the results of the regressions using yearly observations for full 
sample size and of its sub-sample periods. The results of the two sub-periods differ 
diametrically from each other. However, we find the results of post financial reforms 
Sub-Sample (1996–2007) in the same direction as obtained for the Full-Sample (1975–
2007). 
In the Full-Sample (1975–2007), the coefficient on debt, 0.06, is positively related 
to primary budget surplus and is statistically significant. While the coefficient, 3.2, to 
capture the non-linear relationship between debt and primary budget surplus is positive, it 
is statistically insignificant. The positive and significant coefficient, in the benchmark 
regression, suggests that fiscal policy in Pakistan has remained sustainable amid 
expanding public debt. 
For the first Sub-Sample (1975–1995) the coefficient for debt is negative, albeit 
insignificant. While statistically it is not a robust result, it nonetheless implies that for the 
pre reform period until 1995 government’s fiscal policy was not sustainable. While the 
non-linear specification is statistically significant, with strong adjusted R2 and D-W 
statistics, the coefficient, –57.09, of 2)( ddt  however does not appear to be reasonable. 
The results of the second Sub-Sample (1996–2007) are rather encouraging. In the 
benchmark specification, the coefficient of public debt, 0.03, is positive and statistically 
significant thus representing government’s fiscal policy sustainability. The result of the 
estimates  on  the  non-linear  specification  is  consistent  with  the benchmark’s one. The  
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Table 5 
Pakistan’s Fiscal Sustainability 
Full Sample: 1975–2007 
 
.Const 1td GVAR YVAR 2)( ddt 2R DW .TotalObs 
Benchmark –9.90* 0.06* –2.09E-05* 3.64E-05  0.67 1.02 33  
(–5.22) (2.71) (–6.03) (0.44)     










0.67 1.04  33  
Sub-Sample: 1975–1995  
.Const 1td GVAR YVAR 2)( ddt 2R DW .TotalObs 
Benchmark –2.35 –0.043 –4.75E-05* 0.00055  0.42 1.39 21  
(–0.67) (–1.01) (–2.99) (0.37)     










0.69 1.95  21  
Sub-Sample: 1996–2007  
.Const 1td GVAR YVAR 2)( ddt 2R DW .TotalObs 
Benchmark –2.97* 0.033* –1.90E-06 –9.69E-05*  0.39 1.60 12  
(–1.94) (2.1) (–0.69) (–2.4)     










0.58 1.90  12  
Source: Authors’ estimations based on the methodology as outlined in Section 4; data taken from State Bank of Pakistan. 
Note 1:  t-statistics are reported in parenthesis; *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
Note 2: The annual observations mentioned here correspond to the fiscal years; for example, 2007 is FY07.  
nonlinear term, 7.60, is statistically significant and signifies a greater reaction of fiscal 
policy to larger deviations of debt from its long-term mean. Therefore, the results of the 
second Sub-Sample (1996–2007) is the indication of stronger evidence that Pakistan’s 
fiscal policy has remained sustainable even in the recent past.  
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The results of the tests carried out in this study do not present an adverse scenario 
for Pakistan’s economy. In addition to this, Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves reached 
its record high level of U.S. $ 16.3 billion on October 30, 2007. Above all, Pakistan’s 
GDP growth rate, averaging more than 7 percent within the last four years, considerably 
guarantees its external and fiscal sustainability. Therefore, if examined from within the 
predictions of the first- and second-generation models of crisis, Pakistan can be placed in 
‘no-crisis’ zone. 
While there is a broad consensus that deterioration in fundamentals is a major 
cause of crisis, policy-makers have generally failed to prevent several crisis in the past. 
Why? Krugman (1997) while observing on how to prevent a crisis notes, “the real cause 
of currency crisis is not much what you are actually doing, as what the financial markets 
suspect you might want to do.” Arguing on the same lines, Saqib (2003) and Fic and 
Saqib (2006) note that while deterioration in fundamentals did precede the Brazilian 
crisis of 1999 and Russian crisis of 1998, political commitment and stability were other 
important determinants. 
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In particular, for Brazilian crisis, Saqib (2003) argues, “[T]he divided coalition 
government and a president facing impending elections eschewed the correction of 
external misalignments and fiscal austerity at a time when the markets were already 
excited by the 1997-1998 East Asian and 1998 Russian financial crisis.” For Russian 
crisis, Fic and Saqib (2006) argue, “[T]hat the political instability was an important factor 
behind the collapse of the Russian ruble in August 1998. Frequent changes in and of 
government undermined the implementation of much needed institutional and structural 
reforms… Inability to implement consistent and coherent policies to achieve, primarily 
fiscal balances was an equally important determinant of Russian crisis.” 
In effect, the aforementioned Krugman’s argument and the importance of political 
variables in some past crisis suggest that currency crisis is a short run phenomenon and 
the deterioration in fundamentals alone do not dictate a crisis. Therefore, to eventually 
prevent a crisis markets must have a positive view of other crucial factors such as 
political commitment and stability.  
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